This memorandum contains three sections:

  1. Prophetic declarations made in accord with Justice Byron White’s dissent in Roe v. Wade / Doe v. Bolton.

  2. The text of the applicable portion of the Fourteenth Amendment.

  3. The text of Justice White’s dissent.

 

Discussion of Byron White’s dissent at 28:50.

 

1

Prophetic declarations excerpted from Justice Byron WhiTe’s dissent in Roe v. Wade / Doe v. Bolton

The Bound4LIFE team believes that certain portions of Justice Byron White’s dissent are destined to become future law in the form of Supreme Court precedent in Dobbs. This will happen in the same way that portions of Justice McLean’s dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) was destined to become law in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment which erased Dred Scott.

It is important to note that the Dobbs opinion is likely still being written at this very moment. This means that the opinion is being debated, re-written to suit those voting. This is an important moment to pray, prophecy, petition to seek the exact correct language in the opinion. The opinion can be bold, or it can be watered down. It can be clear or it can be vague. We pray it will be bold, clear truth. Again, now is the moment to pray into the language of the coming opinion so that it will clearly: (1) reverse the lie that abortion is a right in the Constitution, and (2) vindicate the text of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than perversion of the text of the Constitution perpetrated in Roe v. Wade.

The following are portions of White’s dissent that should be prophetically declared in faith to become the precedent in Dobbs:

White: “I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment.”

RESPONSIVE PROPHETIC STATEMENTS

  1. There is nothing in the language, text, nor history of the Constitution that supports the court’s creation of a right to abortion in Roe v. Wade.

  2. The word “abortion” is not in the Constitution.

White: “… with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the 50 States are constitutionally dissentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand.”

RESPONSIVE PROPHETIC STATEMENTS

  1. The Supreme Court lacks the power to override state laws prohibiting abortion and protecting life in the womb.

  2. The Supreme Court may not disentitle states from protecting the existence and development of unborn life.

White: “As an exercise of raw judicial power … [The Court’s] judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review …”

RESPONSIVE PROPHETIC STATEMENTS

  1. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade was an unconstitutional exercise of raw judicial power.

  2. While the Court does have power to review the constitutionality of statutes, the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade was a perversion of the power of judicial review that manifested as an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power.

 White: “I find no constitutional warrant for imposing such an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the States.”

RESPONSIVE PROPHETIC STATEMENTS

  1. Nothing in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment supports the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade.

  2. The Fourteenth Amendment should no longer be said to create a so-called “right” that is found nowhere in the text, meaning or history of the Amendment.

2

The Text of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.

“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

RESPONSIVE PROPHETIC STATEMENT

  1. Nothing in the text of the 14th Amendment supports the court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade.

  2. Any and all so-called “rights” or policies derived from Roe v. Wade are likewise cut-off because they too are not supported by the 14th Amendment.

 

3

Justice White’s dissent in Roe v. Wade.

The following the full text of Justice White’s dissent in Roe. There are many excellent points, but prophetically, we do not want to join all of the language of the dissent. We join certain portions of the excellent dissent.

“At the heart of the controversy in these cases are those recurring pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or health of the mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for any one or more of a variety of reasons — convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc. The common claim before us is that, for any one of such reasons, or for no reason at all, and without asserting or claiming any threat to life or health, any woman is entitled to an abortion at her request if she is able to find a medical advisor willing to undertake the procedure.”

“The Court, for the most part, sustains this position: during the period prior to the time the fetus becomes viable, the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus; the Constitution, therefore, guarantees the right to an abortion as against any state law or policy seeking to protect the fetus from an abortion not prompted by more compelling reasons of the mother.”

“With all due respect, I dissent. I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers [410 U.S. 222] and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the 50 States are constitutionally dissentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand. As an exercise of raw judicial power, the Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but, in my view, its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court.”

“The Court apparently values the convenience of the pregnant mother more than the continued existence and development of the life or potential life that she carries. Whether or not I might agree with that marshaling of values, I can in no event join the Court's judgment because I find no constitutional warrant for imposing such an order of priorities on the people and legislatures of the States. In a sensitive area such as this, involving as it does issues over which reasonable men may easily and heatedly differ, I cannot accept the Court's exercise of its clear power of choice by interposing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to protect human life and by investing mothers and doctors with the constitutionally protected right to exterminate it. This issue, for the most part, should be left with the people and to the political processes the people have devised to govern their affairs.”

“It is my view, therefore, that the Texas statute is not constitutionally infirm because it denies abortions to those who seek to serve only their convenience, rather than to protect their life or health. Nor is this plaintiff, who claims no threat to her mental or physical health, entitled to assert the possible rights of those women [410 U.S. 223] whose pregnancy assertedly implicates their health. This, together with United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), dictates reversal of the judgment of the District Court.”

“Likewise, because Georgia may constitutionally forbid abortions to putative mothers who, like the plaintiff in this case, do not fall within the reach of § 26-1202(a) of its criminal code, I have no occasion, and the District Court had none, to consider the constitutionality of the procedural requirements of the Georgia statute as applied to those pregnancies posing substantial hazards to either life or health. I would reverse the judgment of the District Court in the Georgia case.”